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ABSTRACT
The Board of Trade and Plantations was the agency 
empowered to oversee the governing of England’s colonies. 
Although unable to legislate for the colonies, the Board's 
right to review colonial legislation and make recommendations 
to the king and the colonial governors gave it strong powers 
of influence. Colonial governors and legislatures shared the 
task of administering the colonies' day to day affairs. In 
Virginia, the lack of controls by the home government led both 
the governor and the legislature to become increasingly 
independent of Britain during the first half of the eighteenth 
century. They also tried to become independent of each other, 
causing many acrimonious clashes.
By 1748, however, economic interests in Britain and 
Virginia's attempts at self-government compelled the home 
government to increase its control over the plantation. From 
that time forward, the Board of Trade, with Parliament's 
support, began to tighten its grip on the colony. For the 
remainder of the colonial period, the legislature directed its 
anger less toward the governor than toward the London 
government.
The first chapter of this thesis examines the structures 
of the Board of Trade and Virginia's colonial government, as 
well as Virginia's movement away from home-government control 
during the first half of the eighteenth Century. The second 
chapter will focus on the Board's subsequent attempts to 
reassert its power over the colonial government and Virginia's 
efforts at resistance. A central issue to examine is to what 
extent the Board of Trade's policies fostered a colonial 
desire for independence in the 1770s.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BOARD OF TRADE AND PLANTATIONS 
AND THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT OF VIRGINIA
1696-1775
INTRODUCTION
When England encouraged settlement of North America in 
the seventeenth century, it was not the Crown’s intention to 
create an independent nation. Instead, royal officials 
attempted to follow mercantile principles, developing colonies 
that would be sources of raw materials and markets for English 
manufactured goods. Because the colonies were small and 
sparsely settled, and because the British isles themselves 
seethed with turmoil and revolution during the 1600s, few 
attempts were made by the English government to oversee the 
colonies strictly. It was not until 1696 that a monarch 
appointed a board whose members' sole responsibility was the 
monitoring of England's colonial possessions.1
Despite the power of this Board of Trade and Plantations 
to review colonial legislation and to make policy 
recommendations regarding the colonies to the king, to 
Parliament, and to officials in the colonies, until 1748 it 
was the colonial governors and legislatures that primarily 
determined colonial policy. With the appointment of the Earl 
of Halifax as president of the Board of Trade in 1748, the 
agency experienced a brief surge in power. Parliament's grant 
of greater authority to Halifax, coupled with his willingness 
to exercise it, meant that the Board ruled the colonies more
2
3directly and more thoroughly than in any previous period. 
With Halifax's resignation in 1761, Board power diminished 
once again, shifting to the Secretary of State for the 
Southern Department and to Parliament.2
Britain had by then invested heavily in time, men, and 
money for the colonies and was engaged in fighting a war for 
their protection. As repayment, Parliament expected the 
colonies to contribute revenues for the upkeep of the royal 
troops patrolling the colonial frontier. As it attempted to 
extract these funds from reluctant provincial legislatures, 
the frequency and intensity of Parliament's legislative 
clashes with the colonies increased, ultimately prompting some 
local leaders to clamor for independence. Many of these 
revolutionaries were members of Virginia's House of Burgesses. 
In Virginia, despite the efforts of the governors, Parliament, 
and the Board of Trade, the tradition of self-government 
remained strong, and the lower house of the legislature 
managed to maintain and even increase its powers over the 
course of the eighteenth century.
The first chapter of this thesis examines the structures 
of the Board of Trade and Virginia's colonial government, as 
well as Virginia's attempts to move away from home-government 
control during the first half of the eighteenth century. The 
second chapter focuses on the Board's subsequent attempts to 
reassert its power over the colonial government and Virginia's 
efforts to resist.
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CHAPTER I
VIRGINIA AND THE BOARD OF TRADE, 1696-1748
The Board of Trade and Plantations, as constituted by 
William III in 1696, had a supervisory role in the government 
of Britainfs colonies in America. The Board could not 
directly rule the colonies but it had the right to review 
colonial legislation and to make recommendations to the king, 
the Privy Council, and the colonial governors.
Within the colonies, the governor and the legislatures 
shared the power to govern. In Virginia, a royal colony, the 
Crown appointed the governor and the upper house of the 
legislature, the Council. Virginia's freeholders elected the 
members of the legislature's lower house, known as the House 
of Burgesses.
Although the Board of Trade had no power to legislate, in 
its role as counselor it influenced the tenor of the debate 
within the colonies. Since no British institution directly 
governed the colonies, however, the governor and the 
legislature were left in a struggle for power to control the 
colony's daily affairs. Both the governor and the legislature 
became increasingly independent of British control during the 
first half of the eighteenth century. They also tried to 
become independent of each other, leading to many acrimonious
5
clashes. But from 1748 forward the Board of Trade, supported 
by Parliament, began to tighten its controls over the 
colonies. For the remainder of the colonial period, the 
legislature directed its anger less toward the governor than 
toward the London government.
Britain founded its colonial system on two 
contradictory principles: while guaranteeing colonial
Englishmen the same right to government by representative 
institutions enjoyed by Crown subjects in England, Parliament 
based its acts of trade and navigation on the assumption that 
the colonies were unequal and subordinate to the mother 
colony.1 The mercantile principles inherent in this view of 
the colonies tended to prevail, causing the Crown to 
strengthen its oversight of the colonies when they threatened 
to become too independent in the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century.
The English government first formed a separate department 
to oversee colonial affairs in 1660 when the Privy Council 
organized a standing committee of ten members to "receive, 
heare, examine, and deliberate upon any Petitions, 
propositions, Memorialls, or other Addresses which shallbee 
presented or brought in by any person or persons concerninge 
the Plantations." The Council reorganized the committee as 
the Lords of the Committee for Trade and Plantations in 1675; 
William III reorganized it again in 1689. In 1696, William 
III replaced the lords with a separate Board of Trade and
- Plantations whose members were not Privy Council members but 
were advisory to the council; this board governed the colonies 
throughout the remainder of the colonial period.2
The Board's primary responsibility was to promote 
England's trade; it did not directly govern the colonies. 
However, the Board's advisory powers were strong. It 
recommended to the King in Council persons to fill the most 
important colonial offices, including the governorships, and 
maintained correspondence with them during their residence in 
America. The Board also examined laws passed by the colonial 
legislatures, advising the king which to sign and which to 
veto. It heard judicial appeals, and handled requests and 
complaints of English companies and merchants trading in the 
colonies. The Board shared its power with the lords of the 
treasury, who supervised colonial finances, and with the 
commissioners of customs, who regulated the enforcement of the 
trade and navigation acts.3
To carry out its duties, the Board's members needed 
information about the colonies. Since all the members lived 
in England, they received their information through 
correspondence with the governors and through meetings with 
governor-appointed colonial agents. The Board's informational 
needs covered the entire range of life in the colonies: they 
requested copies of all colonial laws passed, accounts of all 
public receipts and payments, lists of all colonial offices 
and officers, accounts of the numbers of inhabitants living in 
each colony, and the amount of firepower each colony
8possessed. The Board also asked the governors to assess the 
effectiveness and the defects of colonial governments, and to 
pass along suggestions "on what Improvements are or may be 
made.1,4
The right which gave the Board the most influence was its 
power to review colonial legislation. The Board reviewed 
every law passed by the colonial legislatures and approved by 
the governors, greatly limiting the legislatures' powers of 
self-government. The Board also reserved the right to review 
all legislation vetoed by the governors, thus limiting the 
extent of their power as well. 5
Yet, other factors limited the Board's influence. The 
King and the Privy Council had retained for themselves control 
of two important powers, the right to hear colonial appeals 
and the right to appoint colonial governors. Despite the 
existence of Poynings Law, which required all colonial 
legislation to receive royal assent before taking effect, the 
great distance between the American colonies and London 
prevented strict adherence to the law; the colonists 
frequently pleaded emergency circumstances in enacting 
legislation which took effect immediately, without the 
requisite suspension clause. The great volume of laws passed 
in the colonies each year prevented the Board from giving 
detailed attention to each law. The Board did not act alone, 
however; it transmitted copies of every colonial act to the 
Crown's attorney general, allowing him to rule on the validity 
of each piece of legislation, and it also solicited the advice
9of other government officials on laws affecting their areas of 
interest. Finally, although the Board sent the king position 
papers advising acceptance or rejection of each law, the king 
was free to disregard the advice, though he rarely did.6
Patronage networks also influenced the Board's practices. 
While the Board's earliest members had strong ties to the 
Privy Council, giving them influence beyond their statutory 
power, later members lacked these ties, and the Board's 
influence declined accordingly. Not until the appointment of 
the Earl of Halifax as president in 1748 did the Board's power 
rise again.
From the other side of the Atlantic, the colonists also
lobbied to affect government policy. Many American
politicians, office holders, and merchants had connections
with well-placed individuals in England willing to lobby the
Board's members for them. But the colonial governors
overmatched their efforts; since they had originally risen to
political power in England and had received their appointments
directly from the Board of Trade, they still had the greatest
opportunity to lobby the Board.7
*
As a royal appointee, the governor was both the king's 
representative in the colony and the channel of communication 
between the colonists and Whitehall, allowing him to shape the 
London government's perceptions of the needs of Virginia and 
the actions of the colony's local government officials. The 
Crown gave the governor the right to regulate all salaries and
10
fees, with the advice and consent of the Council. He 
transmitted a summary of all financial transactions to the 
Board of Trade every six months, along with accounts of all 
political decisions.
The governor also chose the recipients of government- 
appointed jobs in the church and state in the colony of 
Virginia. To receive ordination to the ministry, Virginia 
colonists needed a letter of recommendation from the governor 
to the Bishop of London. The governor ensured that each 
parish had a minister and that the vestry provided for his 
support. The governor and Council held disciplinary powers in 
the Anglican Church: sitting together as the General Court, 
they ruled on all complaints brought against ministers. In 
secular affairs, the governor appointed all important colonial 
officials. The governor also recommended all colonial 
officials, including councillors, who held their appointments 
through commissions from England. The governor could not, 
however, remove appointed officials without the Council's 
advice and consent.8
The governor's powers of appointment allowed him to shape 
the character of the non-elected portion of the colonial 
government. From 1698 until 1756, royal instructions directed 
Virginia's governors to transmit to one of the principal 
secretaries of state and to the Commissioners for Trade and 
Plantations "the names and characters of Twelve persons 
Inhabitants of our said Province whom you shall esteem the 
best qualified for that trust [of councillor]"; as council
11
vacancies occurred, the Board selected new councillors from 
this list, with no other official comment from the colonies. 
The governor's appointive powers also allowed him to bestow 
all positions of trust and profit; governors used these 
positions to cultivate the good will of the council members, 
frequently giving jobs to councillors or their family 
members.9
Each time a new governor arrived in Virginia, his first 
duty was to call together the colony's councillors, to 
promulgate to them the royal commission he had received as 
governor. He then took and administered to the members of the 
Council the prescribed oaths of allegiance and supremacy and 
the Test Act. The governor' s powers to administer these 
oaths— to the Councillors and the Burgesses, to all judges and 
justices, and to all other persons holding any public office 
in the colony— gave him strong symbolic power. It was only 
through his person that the king legitimated and gave power to 
the colonial government.10
The governor derived the most power from his exclusive 
right to approve and to transmit to London all bills passed by 
the Council and the Burgesses. Without the assent of both the 
governor and Whitehall, no bill became law. In his letters of 
transmittal, the governor gave his reasons for assenting to 
the bills; if he disagreed with the purpose of any of the 
bills to which he had assented, he could also voice his 
doubts, in hopes that the Board might then disallow the acts 
and receive the sole share of the colonists' blame. The
12
Board, charged with the overwhelming task of reviewing every 
piece of colonial legislation, relied heavily on the 
governor's legislative assessments.
Virginia's colonial governor, then, through his power to 
appoint councillors, to assent to or disallow bills, and to 
act as the sole voice reporting the actions of Virginia's 
government and inhabitants to Whitehall, determined which 
legislation became law and what view London had of the 
colony's ability to govern itself.
Virginia's Council and House of Burgesses were not 
powerless. The Council predated the governor in Virginia's 
political history. The first body to govern Virginia was a 
council appointed by the London Company, with one councillor 
serving as president. Following the London Company's 
bankruptcy in 1625, Charles I declared Virginia a royal colony 
and appointed the first royal governor.11
However, the Council still retained a measure of its 
power. The councillors individually were influential men, 
drawn from the families with the highest social positions and 
the most money in the colony; they included Commissary James 
Blair and members of the wealthy Byrd and Carter families. In 
addition to the Council's powers of influence, it also held 
legislative powers. Although the Council could not initiate 
legislation, it could approve, amend, or reject all bills 
passed by the assembly; no bill became law without the 
Council's consent. The governor called, prorogued, and
13
dissolved the Assembly with the advice of the Council.
The governor had a close working relationship with the 
Council because he presided over Council meetings at the 
beginning and end of each session and often during the 
session, as his schedule permitted. Until 1682, the governor 
and the Council sat together as the General Court to form the 
colony*s highest court of appeal. The Council also served as 
an advisory board to the governor, since as inhabitants of 
Virginia its members were attuned to the colony's needs. If 
the colonial governor died or became incapacitated, the senior 
member of the Council served in his place until the Crown 
could send a new governor to the colony.12
Despite the close relationship with the governor, the 
Council's interests tended to lie more with the Assembly in 
the eighteenth century. Since councillors were by then native 
Virginians, their needs and wishes often matched more closely 
the needs of the wealthy Virginia-born Burgesses than those of 
the English governors residing temporarily in the colony. In 
addition, after about 1700, the Crown did not allow 
councillors to hold additional appointive offices, including 
the lucrative posts of customs collectors and naval officers. 
This ruling diminished the governor's ability to reward 
councillors who supported his policies and also left the 
councillors with less reason to try to curry favor with the 
governor. During the eighteenth century, councillors tended 
to combine with the Burgesses to stymie the efforts of 
objectionable governors by refusing to make appropriations or
14
to pass acts executing their policies.13
Virginia*s freeholders elected the men who sat in the 
colony's lower house, the House of Burgesses. Any white man 
holding property who was at least 21 years old and not a 
convict could vote. The Burgesses did not set the first 
minimum property requirement for a voting freehold until 173 6, 
when it specified that a freehold be at least one hundred 
acres of unimproved land or twenty-five acres with a house and 
a plantation. This requirement remained in effect throughout 
the remainder of the colonial period. 14
Virginia's lower house initially held annual elections 
and sat jointly with the governor and Council. But when the 
news of the House of Commons' overthrow of Charles I reached 
the colony, the legislators reacted in kind. The Burgesses 
had gained the right to sit separately by 1651. Now, in 1652, 
the Burgesses declared that the governor and Council exercised 
their powers only through a grant from the Burgesses, as 
Cromwell theoretically held power only through the consent of 
Parliament. Even after the Crown reimposed royal control in 
1660, the Burgesses did not entirely surrender their powers; 
during the next two decades, the lower house consolidated its 
exclusive right to initiate legislation.15
The Burgesses' elections became biennial in 1659; three 
years later the house lost its right to annual meetings when 
Governor William Berkeley adopted the practice of proroguing 
the assembly from session to session. The house now held
15
elections and sessions only at the governor’s pleasure; 
sometimes several years passed between sessions and often many 
years passed between elections. In 1715 the house passed an 
act calling for frequent meetings, but the governor refused to 
give the bill his assent.16
The first power the Burgesses seized was the important 
power of the purse. In 1629, the house began to issue 
detailed appropriations bills limiting the governor’s 
discretionary power. For the remainder of the colonial period 
the house insisted that the governor use ordinary tax revenues 
to cover only the costs the house authorized. This meant that 
the governor had to call the Assembly each time he required an 
appropriation not already covered by legislation. No tax or 
appropriation was legal without the Burgesses* consent. To 
ensure that the funds it appropriated would be used only for 
the purposes it specified, the Burgesses challenged the 
governor and in the 1690s won the right to appoint a treasurer 
to oversee Assembly funds.17
By detailing the uses for funds it appropriated, the 
House encroached on the governor's executive power; it also 
limited his military powers by detailing the precise uses of 
men and funds it approved. By the Seven Years' War, the house 
was even directing military operations and appointing and 
removing the Virginia militia's officers.18
The Burgesses also assumed the power to settle fees by 
statute early in the seventeenth century. Initially, the 
house only regulated the fees charged by lesser colonial
16
officials— sheriffs, collectors and naval officers, clerks and 
constables— but by the mid-seventeenth century it also 
regulated the fees collected by the governor, the attorney 
general, and the speaker, sergeant at arms and clerk of the 
House of Burgesses.
Beginning in 1679, the Crown gave the governors authority 
to establish fees without the Burgesses* consent, but only 
Governor Francis Howard challenged the legislature's 
authority. In the mid-1680s the governor tried to impose a 
fee of two hundred pounds of tobacco to affix his seal to land 
patents. The Burgesses appealed the fee to the Privy Council 
on the grounds that the Council and Burgesses had not 
approved. The Privy Council disallowed the fee, although 
solely on the grounds that Howard had failed to secure the 
Council's consent, implying the consent of the Burgesses was 
not necessary. Still, no other governor challenged the 
Burgesses' power to set fees until 1751.19
One undisputed right the Burgesses enjoyed was the 
ability to elect their own speaker, though the governor did 
symbolically approve the speaker. The governor also had the 
right of annually renewing the Burgesses' "Ancient Rights and 
privilidges," including "That They and Their Servants in Their 
persons and Estates might be free from Arrests and other 
Disturbances, That in all their Debates they might have 
freedom and Liberty of Speech and as Occasion Requires access 
to his Honours person."20
The House of Burgesses did, however, lack several
important rights that left it dependent upon the governor. In 
1697 the Board of Trade specifically forbade the approval of 
any Assembly law "by which the number of the assembly shall be 
enlarged or diminished, the duration of it ascertained, the 
qualifications of the electors or the elected fixed or
altered,” but this law merely confirmed early practices. The 
Board also denied the Assembly the right to convene, adjourn, 
or prorogue itself, as to do otherwise would be "highly 
detrimental to our royal prerogatives"; the Assembly met only 
at the governor's pleasure.21
Of even greater consequence to the house was the question 
of the appointment of an agent for the colony. Agents,
appointed by the governors, acted as the colonies'
representatives in London. Their duties included: securing 
approval of colonial legislation; promoting colonial trade; 
protesting and lobbying against Parliamentary legislation 
detrimental to the colonies; handling appeals of the colonies 
to the Privy Council; drafting and presenting petitions to 
Parliament and the Board of Trade; and serving as 
clearinghouses for information for both London and the
colonies. The House of Burgesses repeatedly tried to gain the 
power to appoint the agent because having him on their side 
would be a vital aid when disputes between the governor and 
the Assembly came before the Board of Trade. The Burgesses 
appointed several special agents to represent their interests 
in London, although the house did not gain the power to 
appoint the colony's official agent until 1759.22
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Thus the lower house in 1750 was still in the process of 
developing its power. The House held the sole right to 
initiate legislation, including money bills, and claimed the 
right to audit accounts and control expenditures, to set fees 
and salaries, and to control their internal proceedings. On 
the other hand, it had no control over the frequency of its 
elections or sessions; it had no standing committees to 
provide continuity from session to session; and it did not 
have its own agent to lobby the Board of Trade when 
disagreements arose between the governor and the 
legislature.23
Yet the colonial legislatures still had one important 
power— the power to refrain from action. Although the board 
issued instructions to the governors directing them to have 
the legislatures pass certain laws, the Board could not 
directly rule the colonies. As long as the legislatures were 
willing to enact the Board-requested legislation, relations 
between the two remained placid. But when the legislatures 
refused, as they increasingly did during the eighteenth 
century, Parliament became more willing to step in to 
legislate for the Board.24
William Ill's decision to strengthen and reorganize the 
Lords of Trade in 1696 was in part a response to the economic 
and political problems he saw in the British plantations at 
the time. Several issues arose in the last decade of the 
seventeenth century which gave the Crown further impetus to
19
tighten its control over Virginia in particular.
The first was the colony's slow economic development. 
Many officials in Virginia and in London blamed the problem on 
the plantation system; they feared that the plantations were 
too large to be efficient and too diffuse to encourage rapid 
settlement. Beginning with Governor Thomas Culpeper's 
administration in 1679, the Crown instructed the legislature 
to grant plantations near each other to encourage continuous 
settlement, and to lay out "towns on every river, and 
especially one on at least every great river" through which 
imports and exports would flow; the Crown hoped these measures 
would protect the colony from invasion, and allow for better 
enforcement of the collection of customs duties and trade 
regulations.25
The size of colonial plantations was a second area of 
dispute. Concerned that the Virginia land grants were too 
large to permit full settlement and use of the land, and that 
by patenting all of the most desirable land in the colony they 
discouraged new settlers from coming to Virginia, the Crown 
directed the governors to seek legislation to limit their size 
and so create a class of middling farmers. The Council 
preferred, however, to continue to issue large land grants to 
settle English planters on Virginia's land before the French 
could encroach upon it from the west; governors Francis 
Nicholson and Edmund Andros were willing to overlook Crown 
instructions in the 1690s and to allow the Council to continue 
to approve large land grants.26
20
The final area of contention was the creation of a 
college in the colony. In 1691 the House of Burgesses, 
Council, and governor approved Councillor James Blair's 
proposal to create a college. In 1693, Blair received a royal 
charter for the college, as well as a 20,000 acre site for the 
school, a grant of 2000 pounds sterling from the royal 
quitrents, and the right to levy a penny per pound tax on all 
tobacco shipped from Maryland and Virginia to any destination 
in the empire other than England to help support the school. 
Construction, however, proceeded slowly. Blair finally 
accused Governor Andros of thwarting his attempts to build the 
college; the two men fought at the April 19, 1695 Council
meeting, leading Andros to permanently suspend Blair from the 
Council. But Blair had acquired powerful patrons in London; 
a King's order restored him to the Council in 1696. In 1697, 
Blair returned to England, where he used his influence on the 
recently constituted Board of Trade to help secure Andros's 
resignation.27
The Board of Trade thus quickly came to fill an important 
role as a mediating body between the Virginia legislature and 
the governor; both houses had the right to bring complaints 
regarding the governor's conduct directly before the Board of 
Trade, and other parties with interests in the colonies could 
also press charges before the Board, in cases involving a 
minimum of one hundred pounds sterling (raised to three 
hundred pounds in 1685). The first appeal to the Board came 
in the 1690s, when two creditors appealed a Virginia law
exempting councillors from debt prosecution. In hearings 
before the Board, James Blair and two other Virginia officials 
coincidentally in London, Edward Chilton and Henry Hartwell, 
corroborated the assertion made by Surveyor General Edward 
Randolph that Virginia’s governors, councillors, and burgesses 
had combined to create a land grant system that kept vast 
stretches of land off the markets and thereby retarded 
colonial growth. The Board decided to issue new instructions 
curtailing the power of the governors and the councillors. 
They required the governor to report his reasons for 
suspending a councillor and submit to the Board the 
defendant's replies to his charges. The Board also ruled that 
councillors were now subject to debt prosecution and could no 
longer hold the lucrative positions of customs collectors and 
naval officers. In addition, the Board ordered a survey to be 
made of the land holdings in each colony to aid in the 
collection of back quitrents, and an end to large, speculative 
land holdings. Stung by the Board's criticism of his actions, 
and in poor health, Andros resigned. However, a pattern of 
dispute between the governor and the legislature had 
begun.28
Two intertwined issues caused the most severe of the
(
disputes dividing these two branches of Virginia's government: 
the appointment of agents and the conduct of colonial wars. 
Both issues involved questions of independence and control. 
The governors attempted to conduct colonial warfare free from 
the Assembly's restrictions, while the Burgesses sought to
22
address their grievances to the Crown independent of the 
governors' censorship. The result was a standoff. While the 
colonial legislatures insisted upon detailing the uses of its 
wartime appropriations, the governors financed several wars 
with private funds. Although the Burgesses did not win the 
right to send an official agent to London, they did find funds 
to send several unofficial agents.
The Board of Trade's instructions ordered the governors, 
not the assemblies, to provide for the colonies' defense. 
They requested the governors to insure "that all planters and 
Christian servants be well and fitly provided with arms . . . 
and when and as often as shall bee thought fit mustered and 
trained." The Board also ordered the governors to assist any 
other plantation in distress "with what aid the condition and 
safety of your government can spare." This directive caused 
many disputes between the governors, who sought to comply with 
the Board's directions, and the Burgesses, who wished to 
conserve the colony's men and money. Even when the Assembly 
agreed to provide the necessary supplies, the Burgesses 
generally tried to put specific limitations on the sums of 
money they appropriated, stipulating the purpose of the 
appropriation, the number of men and officers to be raised, 
the rate of pay, the place and period of service, and the 
apportionment of supplies.29
In 1701, the Board of Trade requested every colony to 
provide men and money to erect and maintain forts on the 
northern frontier of New York, which was under threat from
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French and Indian raiding parties. Apportioning the levies 
according to the resources of each colony, the Board required 
Virginia to contribute the greatest amount of money, nine 
hundred pounds sterling, and the second largest number of men 
at 240.
The Burgesses, however, charged that New York's request 
for forts was made under false pretenses "merely to gain a 
Contribution the better to enable them to build forts for the 
Security of their Indian trade." The Burgesses also pointed 
out that forts on the northern New York frontier provided no 
security for Virginia, while sending 240 militia men to New 
York would leave Virginia vulnerable to attack. They 
concluded that they were "content to re lye upon God Almighty s 
Protection without any greater means of human Provision for 
our defense and Security than those directed by our Lawes in 
force and such Acts as we are now about." (Although unstated 
in their message, the Burgesses also probably preferred to 
allow the governor to rely on his own reserve of several 
thousand pounds sterling— gained from his crackdown on 
quitrent evasion— to finance the war effort without raising 
more taxes.) The Burgesses passed a bill instructing William 
Byrd II to present this answer to the king.30
Governor Nicholson cautioned the Burgesses that failure 
to provide for New York's defense "may be of fatall 
Consequence not only to this his Majestys Colony and Dominion 
but likewise to the rest of his Majesties Provinces on the 
Continent."31 The governor and Council, who could not use
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public funds for troops without the Assembly's compliance, 
sent a joint message to the house declaring it wrong to 
believe that New York sought forts merely to improve its fur 
trade.
But the Council, concurring with the Burgesses' belief 
that fcrts erected in New York would not keep invaders out of 
Virginia, ultimately decided to support the lower house's 
resolutions. The Council not only already approved the 
Burgesses' bill, but a committee of councillors met with 
Assembly representatives of the lower house to refine the 
response to the king's request and the instructions for Byrd. 
Although Nicholson asked the Council to support the king's 
position, the Council refused to back down, stating it could 
not do so "without transgressing the Rules of Assemblyes and 
soe hazarding a Breach with the House of Burgesses, which we 
humbly conceive would be both to his Majesties Your 
Excellencys and the Countreys Diservice."32
Nicholson refused to consent to a three hundred pound 
sterling payment to Byrd for his salary and expenses, since 
the colony already had a gubernatorially-appointed agent in 
London. Byrd nevertheless went to London to present the 
Burgesses' response to the Board of Trade, where he met with 
a chilly reception. The Burgesses' use of an agent to present 
its grievances angered the Board as much as the colony's 
refusal to comply with its directives. In a letter to Queen 
Anne, the Board noted that to permit such a form of address 
would be of "ill consequence" lest "the Councils and
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Assemblies should thereby be incouraged to make 
Representations to your Majesty, by particular Agents of their 
own appointment, without the Governours Consent”; the Board 
noted the legislature could appoint its own agent only to make 
a complaint against the governor for maladministration, or 
when the governor refused to transmit the house*s proposals. 
The Board also offered the Queen its opinion "that the reasons 
therein offered for excusing themselves from the foresaid 
Constitution are Insufficient” and asked her to write again to 
request the Burgesses' compliance.33
The legislature, though, refused to back down; it passed 
a resolve stating that the colony could not afford to send New 
York nine hundred pounds and asked the Council to concur. The 
Council requested a conference to discuss the resolve, that 
"being the constant and approv'd method to clear all doubts, 
and to keep a good understanding between the two houses of 
assembly." The Burgesses refused to meet with the Council 
until it had expressed its opinion on the resolve of refusal; 
the Council refused to comply, considering it out of their 
province to express an opinion on the Burgesses' denial of a 
monetary grant.34
The Council then drew up its own letter to the Queen, 
apologizing for addressing the late king through an agent but 
claiming: "we were altogether free from any ill design in this 
Method," never having known before that addresses from the 
plantation could be made only through the hands of the 
governor. "In this particular case our Governor had signified
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so much of his disapprobation of the proceedings of the 
General Assembly on Account of the said Address that we judged 
it would have been improper to have desired or expected his 
mediation or Concurrence therein,” the Council explained. It 
concluded that the colony was unable to spare nine hundred 
pounds for the expedition; it transmitted the letter to London 
through the governor*s hands.35
Governor Alexander Spotswood was even more eager than 
Nicholson to comply with the Board's order to aid neighboring 
colonies threatened by common enemies, occasioning several 
clashes with the lower house, which refused to concur with his 
military policies. The first disagreement came in 1711, when 
the governor asked the Assembly to appropriate funds to permit 
him to carry on a war and make treaties with the Indians; the 
Assembly rebuffed him. Noting that all money bills had to 
originate in the lower house, the Burgesses told Spotswood 
that they "did Judge it most proper to waite the Event of that 
Warr" before raising money to provide men and arms.36
In 1712, Spotswood again assembled the two houses to 
request them to aid the North Carolina inhabitants attacked by 
the Tuscarora Indians. The governor also sought money for a 
campaign to sign treaties with friendly Indian tribes who 
would act as buffers against the Tuscaroras. The Burgesses 
refused this request, although they appropriated twenty 
thousand pounds for an all-out war against the Tuscaroras, 
financed by a tax on manufactures. The Council refused to 
pass the bill, forcing Spotswood to carry on a reduced war,
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privately funded.37
After the Indian campaigns ended, Spotswood received 
Assembly concurrence to several acts he requested, including 
a proposal to create forty inspectors of tobacco who would 
check the quality of tobacco exported from the colony. 
British officials feared that the act would cut customs 
revenues by cutting tobacco shipments, but Spotswood pacified 
then by pointing out that the act would curb smuggling. The 
Burgesses approved the bill partly because they stood to 
receive a share of the two hundred fifty pound a year 
inspectorships.38
In 1715, Queen Anne’s death and the outbreak of the 
Yamassee War forced Spotswood to call new elections. Virginia 
returned only sixteen of the fifty-one Burgesses to office, 
and only one who had supported the tobacco act. When 
Spotswood asked the Burgesses to appropriate money to send 
guns and men to South Carolina's aid against the Yamassee 
Indians, the Burgesses refused to concur unless the governor 
agreed to repeal the act establishing tobacco inspectors. 
Spotswood declined; he decided instead to use royal revenues 
to aid South Carolina.39
The Council sent the house a message defending the 
governor and his policies and urging the Burgesses to 
reconsider their actions lest they endanger the colony's peace 
by their refusal to appropriate defense funds. The house 
refused to yield, so Spotswood dissolved it in September with 
a speech condemning its ineffectiveness. He relieved the
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speaker of the task of summarizing the actions taken by the 
assembly during the session, noting that due to the lack of 
legislation passed he would "Spare you the Confusion of 
telling your own Actions." Spotswood said that although the 
king had requested Virginia to provide aid for South Carolina, 
"neither his Writts nor his Speeches Seem to be of any 
Significancy with your House," for the Burgesses had addressed 
only affairs of local concern. Spotswood concluded his speech 
by saying that "to keep Such an Assembly on foot, would be 
Discrediting a Country that has many able and worthy gentlemen 
in it." 40
Spotswood did not reconvene the Assembly until April 
1718, after the Indian wars had ended. One of the new house's 
first acts was a vote not to include Spotswood*s dissolution 
address in the legislative journal, as to do so would be 
"without precedent and unwarrantable." The house- compounded 
the insult one day later by voting sixty pounds for 
construction of a monument to the late Governor Nott in memory 
of "his prudent and Easye Administration."41
The Burgesses also passed a message to the king 
addressing "severall Attempts of Your Lieutenant Governor 
towards the Subversion of the Constitution of our Government, 
the depriving us of our ancient Right & privileges and many 
hardships which he daily exercises upon your Majesty's good 
subjects of this Colony." The house transmitted the address 
to William Byrd II in London with instructions to present it 
to the king, and to request from the king permission for the
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Assembly to appoint its own agent whenever the need arose. 
The Board not only disagreed with the petition, it also 
observed that the appointment of a special agent was "not only 
very extraordinary but contrary to His Majesties Instructions 
which do not allow of such separate addresses.”42
Spotswood again refused to agree to the Burgesses * 
appropriation of three hundred pounds sterling to pay Byrd. 
In an address to the Assembly, the governor said that he could 
not "allow a person to be Agent for this Colony . . . who is 
only appointed by a Vote of your House, without the 
concurrence of the other Members of the Legislative power." 
He also noted that he was willing to transmit the house’s 
address to Virginia's official colonial agent, and that he was 
sure it would "be as agreeable to his Majesty to receive the 
Addresses of his Subjects of Virginia by the hands of Colonel 
Blakiston, whom his Majesty has allowed to be Agent for this 
Colony as from the Honorable William Byrd (as you call him)." 
Spotswood then adjourned the legislature for two years.43
During the adjournment Spotswood moved to replace several 
councillors, including Byrd, who had been in England for the 
past three years. Although Byrd managed to retain his seat, 
the Board of Trade did name three of Spotswood's supporters to 
vacant seats. When the Council reconvened in 1720, the 
members reached a truce with Spotswood. They agreed that in 
case of disagreement each side would prepare "a fair and 
impartial State of the Case" and send them to the Board of 
Trade for adjudication. The Burgesses also resolved their
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differences with Spotswood, acknowledging "the Satisfaction we 
have to See our Country in So prosperous and flourishing a 
Condition as to want no Supplys from us, as well as to be 
under the Administration of So just a Governour."44
Nevertheless, the Burgesses made one final attempt to 
secure a colonial agent, passing a resolution in 1720 to 
appoint an agent to solicit in Great Britain regarding "all 
such . . . matters as may hereafter be agreed on by this
General Assembly." The Council, following an address by 
Governor Spotswood in which he observed "how far such a 
proceeding will be conformable to our Sovereigns pleasure," 
refused to assent to the bill, killing it. The house did not 
petition for its own agent again until 1753.45
Although the house lost its battle to appoint an agent, 
it had more success in trying to regulate the colonial wars. 
Unable to conduct full-scale war campaigns, Governor Spotswood 
negotiated treaties with the Iroquois in the north as well as 
with the tribes neighboring Virginia to the west, temporarily 
securing peace for the colony. In the 1740s, however, the 
British government entered into a series of imperial wars 
which would last into the 1760s and require the assistance of 
the American colonies.
In 1740 Governor William Gooch brought the house a 
message from the king regarding the newly-begun King George*s 
War. The king requested the colonies to support the cost of 
raising a militia for the upcoming battles since they "by 
their situation, are made capable of bearing a Part in them,
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and most likely to be Gainers by any successful Attempt upon 
the Enemies Territories in New-Spain." The Burgesses agreed 
that it was "reasonable that the American colonies, who are at
least equally concerned, should contribute to the Expense of
\
it." But the house pleaded financial distress and 
appropriated only five thousand pounds toward the expense; the 
governor assented to the act without comment.46
The Crown again approached the colonies in 1746, to 
request money and men to support an expedition to French 
Canada. The house passed a bill granting four thousand pounds 
for the expedition, although with the condition that a house 
committee disburse the funds; the president of the Council, 
acting in place of the ill Governor Gooch, gave the bill his 
assent.47
When the governor requested an additional sum for the 
troops the following year, after the original four thousand 
pounds had been spent, the house refused. The Burgesses*s 
response to the governor noted "we are humbly of Opinion, the 
Sum of Four Thousand Pounds, given by the said Act, is 
sufficient to answer the Purposes then intended by this 
House." The governor, who could not coerce legislative 
action, had to let the matter drop. But the question of 
colonial support for English wars would be of vital importance 
in the second half of the eighteenth century.48
The governor's right to select the colonial agent was not 
the only appointive power the Burgesses challenged. The 
Burgesses also wanted power to select its own leaders.
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Although the legislature retained the power to choose its own 
speaker, in 1686 it lost the right to appoint the clerk who 
recorded lower house*s meetings and kept its records. When 
Clerk Robert Beverley demonstrated the power of his office by 
contesting the governor*s veto powers and altering the 
Burgesses*s records, the Crown dismissed him and authorized 
Governor Francis Howard to appoint a successor.
In 1691, Governor Nicholson allowed the Burgesses to 
choose their own clerk, but Nicholson's successor, Edmund 
Andros, denied the lower house's request and appointed a clerk 
without consultation. Throughout the rest of the colonial 
period the governors appointed the clerk, though they selected 
men acceptable to the house. Moreover, since the clerk relied 
upon the house to appropriate his salary, the Burgesses 
exerted a measure of control over his actions.49
In 1688, the Burgesses, through Virginia's agent Philip 
Ludwell, requested permission to appoint a treasurer to 
examine the governor's accounts of permanent Crown revenues, 
including quitrents, fines, forfeitures, and tobacco taxes. 
The Board refused the house's request and the governor 
continued to appoint the treasurer. In 1691, however, 
Governor Nicholson allowed the legislature to nominate and 
appoint by statute its former speaker, Edward Hill. The 
following year, Nicholson gave Hill a collectorship and 
appointed Councillor Henry Whiting treasurer; the Council 
supported him and Whiting remained treasurer until his death 
two years later. A five-year power struggle followed, as the
33
house refused to appropriate money to rebuild the recently- 
burned capitol until the governor allowed them to appoint the 
new treasurer. In 1699 Nicholson finally allowed the 
Burgesses to name speaker Robert Carter to the post.50
The lower house retained this power of appointment 
throughout the colonial period, generally naming either the 
current or a former speaker treasurer. This was a shrewd 
parliamentary move, since the governor could hardly refuse to 
appoint as treasurer a man whom he had already approved as 
worthy of the office of speaker. In 1702 the Crown's 
instructions directed the governor to permit the Assembly 
"from time to time to view and examine all accounts of money 
disposed of by virtue of laws made by them." Although this 
order permitted the Burgesses much less latitude than they had 
requested in 1688, it did give them official Crown recognition 
of their role in overseeing colony finances. By 1738 the 
governor and parliament tacitly approved the Burgesses' power 
to nominate and appoint the treasurer; when a vacancy occurred 
in the post that year during a period when the Assembly was 
not in session, Governor Gooch and the council appointed a 
temporary replacement, to serve only until the house could 
meet and nominate its own treasurer. 51 7
The power the Burgesses gained was vital since the 
government body which controls financial appropriations is the 
body which shapes legislative policy. The Burgesses' power to 
appoint the treasurer, combined with their right to initiate 
legislation, gave them a large measure of control within the
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colony of Virginia.
As the Burgesses* political strength grew, their 
numerical strength grew as well, due to the colony's westward 
expansion. Virginia*s expanded settlement rested in turn upon 
the cultivation of tobacco. As tobacco prices rose in the 
eighteenth century, farming in Virginia became more 
profitable. Individuals and companies began to request large 
western land patents from the governor and the Council, 
raising the question whether Virginia's government had the 
authority to expand the colony's borders and risk encroaching 
upon land claimed by Indians, the French, or the Spanish.
The Board of Trade, beginning with its instructions to 
Governor Thomas Culpeper in 1680, tried to encourage 
concentrated, rather than expanded, settlement in the colony 
of Virginia. Noting that the town-based province of 
Massachusetts was more economically developed than was the 
plantation-based colony of Virginia, the Board recommended the 
establishment of port towns. The bills approved by the 
Assembly in 1680, 1684, and 1691, however, all called for the 
encouragement of manufactures in the towns, leading the Crown 
to disallow them. Early in the eighteenth century, the Crown 
made one final attempt. The royal instructions Governor 
Edward Nott brought to Virginia advised that the establishment 
of port towns on the four great rivers on the eastern shore of 
Virginia would **be particularly useful and serviceable in 
bringing the people to a more regular settlement, and of great 
advantage to trade in the more expeditious lading and unlading
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of ships.” As an added benefit, by directing all ships to 
port towns, rather than allowing planters to load ships from 
their private wharves, the act would increase customs 
collection and limit smuggling.
Virginia's legislature accordingly passed An Act for 
Establishing Ports and Towns, which Nott signed in 1706. But 
when the governor passed the act on to the Board, they 
signalled their disapprobation to the queen. The Board 
complained that the bill extended further than the Crown had 
intended because it established the ports as separate or free 
boroughs, with markets twice a week and fairs once a year, a 
merchant guild, and all the customs and liberties commonly 
belonging to a free borough. Moreover, the Board feared that 
the ports would encourage manufacturing, which Britain's 
mercantile policy discouraged. Accordingly, the queen 
repealed the act.52
While the Board of Trade concerned itself with ensuring 
the faithful collection of customs duties on tobacco, the 
governor and legislature worked together to raise the price 
and quality of Virginia's tobacco products. With his proposal 
to appoint tobacco inspectors, Governor Spotswood was the 
first governor to suggest legislation in this direction. 
Spotswood also ignored his royal instructions by allowing the 
Burgesses to enact a bill raising to five pounds sterling per 
head a duty on slaves imported into Virginia; the Burgesses 
intended to thereby curb tobacco production and thus drive up 
the price of tobacco. Although the Board of Trade permitted
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this act to stand, it was cool to the idea of tobacco 
inspectors, regarding the bill as a restraint on trade and a 
control on tobacco production and therefore on revenue. The 
Board allowed the original tobacco inspection act to remain in 
effect, although in 1717 it recommended the disallowance of a 
1714 bill extending the act through 1718. At the same time 
the Board asked the king to approve an additional instruction 
to the colonial governors, forbidding them to approve any acts 
which could in any way affect trade or shipping unless the 
acts contained a clause suspending enforcement pending royal 
approval.53
In 1730, Governor Gooch proposed a bill similar to the 
one repealed in 1717; it called for the inspection of all 
tobacco shipped abroad and the destruction of all unacceptable 
tobacco, and for the maintenance of detailed records to 
prevent tobacco smuggling. The Burgesses and Council passed 
the bill, entitled An Act for Improving the Staple of Tobacco, 
following intense lobbying from the governor. Gooch then sent 
a memorial to the Board of Trade, assuring the commissioners 
that the act would, by raising tobacco prices, encourage 
farmers to plant more, thus increasing Crown revenue. The 
Board approved the bill for a four-year trial period. Riots 
broke out when the bill first took effect because small 
farmers feared it would cut into their profits. But the 
Assembly, meeting that spring, moved to amend the most 
objectionable portions of the bill and expressed to the 
governor "the Sense this House has of the Expediency of that
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Law." Fortunately for Gooch, the price of tobacco did indeed 
rise, though due more to poor weather than to the act's 
effects. Nevertheless, the Virginians and the Board of Trade 
credited the tobacco act and it remained in effect.54
As tobacco prices rose, the push for westward expansion 
across the Allegheny Mountains to the Ohio River valley 
intensified. James Patton made the first petition for land in 
April 1743, requesting 200,000 acres on the "three branches" 
of the Mississippi. Governor Gooch and the Council initially 
refused the request because they feared that it would lead to 
conflict with the French. As more petitioners made 
applications for land, however, the Council decided to stake 
Virginia's claim to the land and grant Patton title to one 
hundred thousand acres, with an additional one hundred 
thousand acres to follow when he had settled one hundred 
families.
In 1747, the Ohio Company petitioned for a land patent, 
but Governor Gooch again refused to grant it. Instead, he 
forwarded the petition to the Board of Trade, noting that he 
feared that granting the petition would antagonize the French. 
The Board ruled that the suggested expansion of settlement 
would promote peace "in as much as Our Loving Subjects will be 
thereby enabled to cultivate a Friendship and carry on a more 
extensive Commerce with the Nations of Indians inhabiting 
those parts," and also expressed a hope that Virginia's 
westward expansion might encourage other colonies to follow 
suit. The Board therefore drafted instructions to Gooch
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empowering him to make the land grant, to temporarily exempt 
the settlers from payment of quitrents, and to authorize the
t
building of a fort in the territory.55
Thus by 1750, Virginia was growing in geographic size and 
in economic strength. The colony would not long tolerate 
controls on its political power. When the Board of Trade and 
Parliament tightened their controls over the colonies and
increasingly legislated for them in the second half of the
eighteenth century, they set themselves on a collision course
with the colonial legislature.
By 1748 economic interests in Britain compelled the home 
government to attempt to increase its control over its
plantations. The American colonies had become more vital to 
Whitehall as their trade had gradually but steadily grown over 
the preceding one and a half centuries. And Virginia was the 
jewel in the crown, paying into the royal exchequer more 
revenues than any other North American colony. According to 
Surveyor General Robert Dinwiddle's 1743 report to the Duke of 
Newcastle, Virginia colonists owned fifty trading ships which 
helped them to export annually products worth 380,000 pounds 
sterling, including wheat, Indian corn, flour, bread, pork, 
deerskins, lumber, and iron and 35,000 hogsheads of tobacco. 
Virginia imported an additional 180,000 pounds sterling of 
goods each year.56
Factors within Britain also pulled for tighter control 
over the colonies. Due to the colonial Indian wars and the
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imperial wars, Britain had by now expended large sums of money 
and men to retain the colonies, creating a sizable national 
debt. * British merchants had also invested money in the 
colonies, extending to them the large sums of credit necessary 
to maintain the trading partnership; these merchants had 
allies in the House of Commons willing to protect their 
interests. Finally, the Crown strengthened the hand of the 
Board of Trade by appointing the Earl of Halifax to lead it; 
he increased the Board's oversight activities over the next 
decade.57
At the same time, however, the colonies were pulling away 
from Great Britain. By now, native-born Americans controlled 
every branch of government in the colonies except the 
governorships; these rulers worried more about colonial 
problems than about Britain's needs.
A 1701 letter from the Board of Trade to William III had 
advised him of the refusal of the proprietary and chartered 
colonies to comply with royal instructions; instead these 
colonies ignored trade and navigation acts, made laws contrary 
to the laws of England, harbored illegal traders and goods, 
and refused to aid in colonial defense by supporting the 
militia. The Board's remedy was simple— to revoke the 
independent charters entitling them to absolute government and 
to reassume them to the crown.58
Fifty years later, Virginia and the other royal colonies 
appeared to be behaving in a similar manner. The Board of 
Trade and Parliament now faced a choice: either to accept the
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primacy of the colonial assembly and involve the colonists in 
their own governance, or to assert the primacy of the imperial 
bureaucracy and increase Whitehall's control over the 
colonies. They chose the latter course, leading to
increasingly frequent and acrimonious clashes with the 
colonies over the next quarter century.59
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CHAPTER II
VIRGINIA AND THE BOARD OF TRADE, 1748-1775
The Board of Trade was a unique entity in the British 
government. It did not exercise final authority; its 
decisions were subject to the review and approval of the Privy 
Council and the king. It did not owe its allegiance to any 
one ministerial or administrative office. Instead, it had 
close ties to the Privy Council, Parliament, the secretary of 
state for the Southern Department (hereafter SSSD), and the 
Treasury; these departments could, and often did, have 
conflicting interests. It did not have formal connections 
with the two bodies with which it most closely worked, the 
Southern Department and the Privy Council, but it served as an 
information clearinghouse and as a source of policy 
recommendations for both. While these arrangements gave the 
Board some flexibility and some chances to act as a swing 
vote, it also meant that the Board's power was tenuous and 
easily encroached upon by other ministers.1
The Board of Trade's powers diminished during the second 
quarter of the eighteenth century, particularly during the 
Duke of Newcastle's tenure as SSSD. The secretaries of state 
were ex officio members of the Board of Trade, and the SSSD 
was responsible for overseeing English affairs in the southern
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European states and in the colonies. Newcastle, through the 
force of his position and through his ties to other cabinet 
officials, was able to appropriate many of the Board's duties. 
The Board, composed at the time of men with little interest or 
talent in colonial affairs, permitted the takeover of its 
duties and lapsed into lethargy. The Board reasserted itself, 
however, when the Earl of Halifax became first lord of the 
Board in 1748.2
Halifax believed that the SSSD had infringed too much 
upon the Board's powers. All letters from colonial officials 
relating to important matters went directly to the secretary. 
The Southern Department had assumed many of the powers found 
in the Board of Trade's commission, including the rights of 
"recommending what may be proper to be passed in the 
assemblies, of hearing complaints of oppression and mal­
administration and representing thereupon."3
When Halifax assumed the office of first lord, he 
demanded and received the powers of a secretary of state.4 He 
regained powers which Newcastle had assumed, such as the right 
to correspond with the colonial governors: the governors now 
sent their letters and reports directly to the Board, unless 
they had business specifically with a secretary of state. 
Halifax also acquired new rights, including the authority to 
nominate colonial officials. In 1752 he secured passage of an 
Order-in-Council confirming the Board's right to nominate men 
for all offices not under the jurisdiction of either the 
treasury or customs offices. The patronage this order brought
47
significantly increased the Board's power while it 
correspondingly diminished that of the secretary of state. 
Halifax also increased the Board's power by his own energy, 
ambition, and political influence, and by recruiting able men 
to serve on the Board. The greater importance of colonial 
affairs during the war years of 1739 further strengthened the 
Board.5
During the Seven Years' War, the Board was partially 
responsible for the colonies' defense; it passed on to the 
Ordnance Board of the Privy Council, with recommendations of 
approval or disallowance, the governors' appeals for 
additional forts and military stores. The Board also framed 
a plan for colonial union (which was never tried)6; provided 
a system to superintend the Indians; tried to establish fixed 
and permanent revenues for the support of the local 
government; revised the governors' instructions to impress 
upon the colonists the weight of government control; and 
sought ways to restrain illegal trade.7
Halifax found that the lack of regular mail service 
between the colonies and Great Britain hampered his 
administration. Letters were entrusted to merchant vessels, 
which sailed infrequently and often indirectly between North 
America and England. By complaining of the "great 
inconvenience and prejudice to Your Majesty's service and to 
the trade and commerce of Your Majesty's subjects," the Board 
secured regular packet service across the Atlantic in 1755.8
But the Board still faced other difficulties, including
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limited government funding, and its additional 
responsibilities for trade matters limited the time it could 
devote to colonial affairs. The Board saw its authority 
challenged from above by the SSSD, by Parliament, and by the 
Treasury, and from below by the growing power of the colonial 
assemblies. Halifax maintained the Board's power, but with 
his resignation in 1761 authority over colonial affairs 
shifted once more toward the Southern Department.9
An Order-in-Council of 1761 rescinded the Board's right 
to nominate colonial officials, depriving it again of control 
of patronage in North America. The Board lost the rest of its 
powers five years later when, in the words of the Earl of 
Hillsborough, the Board's new first lord, an Order-in-Council 
"provided the board should be altered from a board of 
representation to a board of report upon reference only; that 
the order to the governors in America to correspond with the 
Board of Trade only be rescinded; and that every executive 
business that has by degrees crept in to the board should 
revert to the proper offices, particularly Treasury 
business. "10
By 1766, the SSSD had gained the supervisory role for the 
American colonies; he directed the colonies' defense, 
controlled their patronage, and handled their correspondence; 
the secretary supervised the Board of Trade and decided what 
business it would handle.11
In 1768, the president of the Board of Trade was made a 
full secretary of state for the colonies, giving him
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independence from the SSSD; this arrangement remained in 
effect until the abolishment of the Board in 1782. 
Paralleling this change, however, was the greater control the 
Treasury department and Parliament were beginning to exert 
over the colonies. The war years of 1739 to 17 63 placed an 
unprecedented burden on the Treasury department, which raised 
and provisioned the British troops stationed in North America 
during and after the wars, and also reimbursed the colonial 
governments for their military expenditures. George
Grenville, chancellor of the exchequer from 1762 to 1765, 
designed commercial regulations which would also generate 
revenue to support the military. Grenville, seeking a more 
efficient way to administer the colonies, sought to draw them 
closer to England.12
To enact his policies, Grenville needed Parliament's 
support. Parliament had begun to take a more active role in 
the management of the colonies in the 1730s, when it passed 
the Molasses Act prohibiting the importation of sugar and rum 
from the West Indies. The Proclamation of 1763, the Currency 
Act of 1764, the Sugar Act, and all the acts which followed in 
the decade before the Revolution, increased. Parliament's 
presence in the colonies to an unprecedented extent. These 
parliamentary taxes, sponsored and enforced by the British 
Treasury, as well as the Treasury's strict enforcement of the 
customs acts, were basic among the causes of the American 
Revolution.13
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The Board of Trade's greatest problem in America also 
stemmed from the appropriation of taxes. In theory, the 
elected assembly was supposed simply to vote taxes to meet the 
colony's expenses; the governor, with the advice and consent 
of the royally-appointed council, was to determine how to 
spend the revenue. But in practice, the assembly limited the 
governor's discretion by appropriating taxes only to cover 
particular expenses. This meant that a group of men over whom 
the Board exercised no effective control shaped the colonies' 
politics. The assemblies' power became especially strong 
during the Seven Years' War, when each colonial assembly 
determined the amount of money and the number of men its 
colony would grant the British war effort. After 1763 Britain 
sought to reassert imperial control by challenging many of the 
powers the assemblies had acquired over the previous century, 
particularly the exclusive right to tax.14
At the end of the Seven Years' War, the Virginia 
Burgesses' powers included: the exclusive right to frame money 
issues; the power to appropriate all revenues and to appoint 
committees to dispose of them; and the authority to audit all 
accounts of public officers. The Burgesses occasionally 
authorized the emission of paper money to finance Virginia's 
wartime expenses; the Board could not disallow the paper 
currency without hampering the war effort. The Burgesses 
established a committee of trade, to consider all matters 
relating to the colony's trade, with the power to subpoena the 
persons, papers, and records it needed. The Burgesses had
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freedom of speech and freedom from arrest while the assembly 
was in session. They could determine disputed elections, 
expel members, and regulate internal procedures.15 Because 
they claimed many of the same rights possessed by the House of 
Commons, the Burgesses began to view the Council and the 
Assembly together as a miniature Parliament; this custom 
explains in part why they found the British Parliament's 
attempts to restrict their powers in the 1760s and 1770s 
particularly infuriating.16
Many restraints still remained on the Assembly. If the 
Burgesses could determine the qualifications for voters, the 
Crown still decided when they voted. Virginia's General 
Assembly passed an act in 1762 which required that an election 
for the House of Burgesses be held every seven years, and that 
the Burgesses meet at least once every three years. The Board 
of Trade vetoed the act, leaving the power to prorogue and 
dissolve the Assembly and to call for new elections in the 
hands of the colonial governor.17
Many of the "rights" claimed by the Burgesses were simply 
customs, not laws. Although the Burgesses, in imitation of 
Parliament, had claimed exemption from arrest during session 
since 1624, the Board of Trade disallowed the Burgesses' 
attempt to write the custom into law in 1769. Likewise, since 
1699 the Burgesses had routinely appointed the speaker to 
serve as the colony's treasurer as well. This, though, was 
merely a long-established custom which could be ended at any 
time by a directive from the governor or from the Board of
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Trade.18
One of the most significant powers the Burgesses gained 
during the Seven Years1 War was the right to appoint a 
colonial agent. These agents were the colonies' lobbyists in 
London. They sought approval of colonial legislation and 
lobbied against parliamentary legislation detrimental to the 
colonies' interests; they promoted the colonies' trade, 
handled appeals to the Privy Council, presented petitions, and 
served Parliament as sources of information on the colonies. 
By controlling the agents, the lower houses ensured that they 
would have a voice before the Board of Trade anytime they were 
involved in a dispute with the colonial governors. Virginia's 
Assembly passed a bill appointing a colonial agent in 1718, 
but the Council rejected the bill. In 1753, the Burgesses 
sent Peyton Randolph to act as an unofficial agent and 
directed the treasurer to fund him from the money in the 
colony's treasury. Three years later the Burgesses again 
passed an act appointing an agent, but the Council refused to 
grant its assent.19
The Burgesses renewed the attempt in 1759, drawing up a 
bill appointing Edward Montagu agent. According to the bill's 
terms, he would serve under the direction of a committee of 
correspondence comprising four Councillors and eight 
Burgesses. He would receive five hundred pounds sterling 
annually from the colony's treasurer and serve for seven 
years, although the committee could remove him from office if 
necessary. The Assembly attempted to attach the agent's bill
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to a money bill to secure its passage. Newly-arrived Governor 
Francis Fauquier refused to permit the rider, although he 
agreed to a separate agent's bill because he "could not see 
the ill consequence of letting them have an Agent, upon their 
raising money on themselves to pay him." Fauquier meanwhile 
reassured the Board of Trade that "[n]otwithstanding this 
appointment of an agent by Act of Assembly, Mr. [James] 
Abercrombie is still continued as Agent to me and the Council 
to transact all business relating to the Royal Revenues, and 
such other affairs as are immediately under our cognizance 
only." The Burgesses, holding a majority on the committee of 
correspondence, were now ensured of having a voice at 
Whitehall to represent their interests, rather than just those 
of the governor or Council.20
The Burgesses had gained the right to appoint an agent at 
a time when the agents were at the height of their power. 
During the Seven Years' War, the agents were vital sources of 
information for the officials directing the war effort from 
Whitehall. The agents achieved a degree of cohesion because 
their wartime duties, including negotiating, apportioning, and 
receiving treasury reimbursements for the colonies' respective 
defense expenditures, necessitated regular meetings and 
cooperation. The colonies were quick to see that the agents 
had strength in numbers. Writing to agent Edward Montagu in 
1764, Virginia's Committee of Correspondence directed him to 
work with the other colonial agents, "[s]ince we find, upon 
other occasions, that you have met with a ready disposition in
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the Agents of the other Colonies to Cooperate with you, 
whenever the general Interest of the Continent of America 
seems to have been concern'd.” The high point of the agents' 
cooperation occurred in 1765 when they lobbied to secure the 
repeal of the Stamp Act.21
But the agents faced problems as well. Since they could 
act only under colonial instruction, the slow pace of 
communications between England and the colonies meant that 
they could not respond quickly to policy changes from Great 
Britain. In the post-1766 period, when the colonists' views 
toward imperial government changed rapidly, the agents were 
often ignorant of current thinking, leaving Britain partially 
unaware of the growth in colonial radicalism.22
By 1761, the Board of Trade had decided not to interfere 
with the selection of colonial agents and forbade the colonial 
governors to interfere either, noting that "the 
Representatives of the People are and ought to be free to 
chuse whom they think proper to act, in whatever concerns the 
affairs and interest of the Colony here and with whom they 
and the Council only can correspond."23 With Halifax's 
resignation in 1761, however, the Board lost influence. Power 
shifted to the Southern Department, where the Earl of 
Hillsborough, secretary of state for the American Department, 
contended that all three branches of the colonial governments 
should agree to appoint only one agent. In 1771, Hillsborough 
told agent Benjamin Franklin that "[t]he House of 
Representatives has no right to appoint an agent. We shall
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take no notice of any agents, but such as are appointed by 
acts of Assembly, to which the governor gives his assent.”24
The Virginia Burgesses had already become disappointed in 
agent Montagu*s performance; in 1770 they had resolved not to 
continue him in office. Instead, the Burgesses lobbied 
Parliament and the king from that time forward through their 
committees of correspondence.25
Although both burgesses and councillors were natives of 
Virginia, they did not always cooperate, as the Council's 
refusals of the Burgesses' agent bills demonstrate. Unlike in 
England, where the members of the upper house held their seats 
by birthright and could not be removed by the Crown, in 
Virginia, the Councillors received their appointments from the 
king, served during pleasure, and could lose their seats at 
any time. The governor had the right to preside over all 
Council meetings. So the ties between the appointed Council 
and the Crown were much closer than those between the Crown 
and the elected Burgesses. When Virginia began to pull away 
from Britain in the 1760s and 1770s, the Burgesses, not the 
Councillors, led the way.26
The governor of Virginia was largely independent of the 
Assembly's control. In recompense for Bacon's Rebellion, the 
General Assembly voted the Crown a perpetual fund to pay Crown 
officials, placing them beyond local control. The governor 
also received wide discretionary powers from the Board of
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Trade*. Governor Dinwiddle's instructions provided that if 
anything occurred "which is not therein or by our commission 
provided for, we do hereby allow you, with the advice and 
consent of our said Council, to take order for the present 
therein, giving unto our foresaid Commissioners for Trade and 
Plantations speedy notice thereof." 27
At the same time, the governor was to keep a tight rein 
on the House of Burgesses. They were not to assent to any 
bills "by which the number of the assembly shall be enlarged 
or diminished, the duration of it ascertained, the 
qualifications of the electors or the elected fixed or 
altered;" if the Assembly queried his instructions, he was to 
"accordingly insist upon It that they have no right to adjourn 
themselves otherwise than in de die in diem except Sundays and 
holidays without leave from you our governor," as to do 
otherwise would be "highly detrimental to our royal 
prerogative."28 The governor was not to assent to any bill of 
less than two years' duration, as a bill of a shorter duration 
would expire before the Board could review it, nor to any bill 
"of unusual and extraordinary Nature and Importance" which 
lacked a clause suspending it until the Board could review it. 
The Board's instructions forbade the governor "to suffer any 
publick money whatsoever to be issued or disposed of otherwise 
than by Warrant under Your hand, by and with the advice and 
Consent of the Council" or to assent to any law regarding 
trade and manufacture whereby Virginia's residents "may be put 
on a more Advantageous footing, than those of this Kingdom."29
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In addition to the support he received from the Board for 
his decisions, the governor's position was strengthened by the 
fact that he alone was authorized to communicate with the 
Board of Trade. If the Assembly wished to complain about a 
policy decision made by the governor or by the Board, it had 
to send its address through the governor. He passed along the 
Burgesses' letters with sometimes less-than-flattering 
comments. In 1760, for example, Governor Fauquier wrote to 
the Board to explain why the Burgesses, instead of keeping a 
regiment in the colony's constant pay to guard the frontiers, 
only appropriated money when danger was imminent: "whoever
charges them with acting upon a premeditated concerted plan 
don't know them; for they mean honestly, but are Expedient- 
Mongers in the highest degree, even to their own cost daily."
The governors were hampered, however, by poor 
communication between the colonies and Britain. Not only were 
ships slow and service unscheduled, but those ships that did 
sail were prey to pirates and privateers. In post-1748 
colonial Virginia the generally short tenure of the lieutenant 
governors weakened their position. Two governors died during 
this period (Francis Fauquier in 1768 and Norborne Berkeley, 
baron de Botetourt, in 1771), leaving the government in the 
caretaker hands of the Council president until London 
appointed a new lieutenant governor. The powers held by 
acting governors were more limited than those of lieutenant 
governors, so the Council and the House of Burgesses grew in 
strength proportionately. The acting governor could not
58
dissolve the Assembly, remove or suspend any Councillors, or 
other civil and military officials, without the advice and 
consent of seven of twelve Councillors, nor could he "pass any 
Acts but what are immediately necessary for the Peace and 
Welfare of Our said colony without [the King's] particular 
Order for that purpose."30 As Virginians, these acting 
governors were sometimes more sympathetic to the Burgesses1 
point of view than the newly-arrived lieutenant governors. 
Acting Governor William Nelson, for example, in writing to the 
Board to explain the Burgesses' reasoning behind an act 
disallowed by the king, noted that "[i]t is to be lamented 
that the Remoteness of our Situation from the Royal Presence 
may too often subject our Assembly to some degrees of Censure, 
however unexceptionable their Conduct may be."31
The British government could most effectively control the 
colonies by requiring them to submit their laws for review by 
the Board of Trade and the Privy Council and by forbidding the 
governors to assent to any law which was not in the proper 
form. All colonial laws had to receive the assent of the 
governor, Council, and House of Burgesses; they had to be of 
indefinite duration; and those of an unusual nature required 
a suspending clause. The governor had to send all laws to 
London for the king's approval within three months from the 
time of passage.32
The Board of Trade received all colonial laws, either 
directly from the colonies or indirectly via a secretary of
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state or the Privy Council. A Crown counselor serving as the 
Board's legal adviser reviewed all colonial legislation; he 
ensured that the laws would not conflict with British 
constitutional law or with parliamentary law regulating 
colonial trade, and would not be detrimental to the royal 
prerogative. The Board could also refer bills to other 
government departments, such as the Treasury, for reports on 
their probable effects. The Board, in light of this evidence, 
then made its final recommendation for confirmation or 
disallowance to the Privy Council; in the majority of cases 
the Privy Council accepted the recommendations.33 The Privy 
Council disallowed only 4.3 percent of all of colonial 
Virginia's legislation; the average disallowance rate for all 
colonies was 5.5 percent. Of all laws passed by legislatures 
during the colonial period, not more than one fourth received 
recommendations for either confirmation or disallowance; the 
Board simply allowed them to stand.34
The Board was most concerned with preventing colonial 
laws from encroaching upon the royal prerogative. The Board 
discouraged the assemblies' attempts to re-enact English 
statutes or to declare the laws of England wholly or partially 
in force in the colonies lest they decrease the colonies' 
sense of subordination and dependence or deprive the Crown of 
its right to veto each individual law. The Crown could veto 
a law passed by a royal colony at any time, even years after 
the law had gone into effect. The Crown did permit appeals of 
vetoes and disallowances to the Board of Trade; this allowed
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the Board to mold colonial constitutions and to force the 
assemblies to amend certain acts which the governor and the 
council had not managed to make them change.35
But lack of knowledge about local demands for laws 
impeded the Board's ability to judge fairly colonial 
legislation. The Board had to depend for its information on 
representations from the legislature, on comments from the 
governor, and on reports from colonial agents.36
At the close of its 1745 session, Virginia's General 
Assembly appointed a committee to revise the colony's laws, 
since they had not been recodified in forty years. The 1748 
assembly spent nearly its entire session reviewing the 
committee's work. Revision was completed and the laws were 
approved by the governor in 1749; he sent them to England for 
a routine review. In 1752, the Assembly, believing that the 
king had had sufficient time to consider the laws, had them 
printed and promulgated. But in April 1752, the governor 
informed the Assembly ''that he had just received his Majesty's 
Order in Council, repealing Ten Acts passed in the last 
Session of Assembly and Confirming Fifty Seven Others."37
Rather than giving the laws a cursory glance, the newly 
reinvigorated Board under the Earl of Halifax had carefully 
scrutinized each of the seventy-seven acts passed by Virginia. 
It recommended to the king that he approve fifty-seven acts 
which appeared "to relate chiefly to the particular 
Convenience and Government of Your Majesty's said Colony, and
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to be no way contrary to the Laws of the Kingdom or Your 
Majesty's Instructions to Your Governor." The Board 
recommended probationary status for seven laws, referred three 
more to the Treasury for further consideration, and 
recommended disallowance of ten laws for a variety of reasons, 
such as encroaching upon the royal prerogative, creating 
inconveniences, and repealing previously enacted laws without 
including suspending clauses.38
The disallowance of the ten laws inconvenienced Virginia, 
since the new laws had already taken effect; it required the 
Assembly to temporarily resurrect the old laws and review 
recent judicial decisions. More worrisome to the General 
Assembly was the royal signature affixed to the other fifty- 
seven acts, because they could now only be revised by laws 
carrying a clause suspending execution pending royal 
approval.39
The Board's action was its first taken under a 1738 royal 
instruction forbidding the governors to assent to any 
temporary laws, reenactments of previously disallowed laws, or 
measures which repealed previously approved laws but lacked 
suspending clauses. The Board severely restricted the 
Virginia Assembly's flexibility while simultaneously 
increasing its Own power.40
The Burgesses and Council drew up a joint resolution 
explaining the colony's need for the laws which the Board had 
disallowed and the problems created by their disallowance. 
The General Assembly also expressed its concern that the king
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had ratified fifty-seven acts as "We apprehend we have not 
full Power now to revise alter or amend the same, without such 
suspending Clause, which if understood in a strict Sense will 
subject Us to great Hardships and Inconveniences" whenever an 
act required a speedy alteration.41
The Burgesses, perceiving that Governor Robert Dinwiddie 
sympathized with their plight, petitioned him to support the 
joint resolution. Dinwiddie promised "to have the
Representation you intend to make, jointly with the Council, 
presented and introduced to his sacred Majesty in a proper 
manner. And will add all my Interest, and do every Thing in 
my Power, in representing the Facts in so strong a Manner, as 
to obtain such just Relief, as your humble Address prays and 
requires. "42
To further strengthen its position, the House resolved to 
appoint an agent to London "to solicit the Address, and 
Representation of the Council and this House, to his Majesty." 
The Burgesses accepted the governor's suggestion to delegate 
the task to the Council's agent, James Abercrombie.43
Despite Virginia's united front, the Board refused to 
alter its decision to confirm and to disallow the colony's 
laws. Virginia had to include suspending clauses in its 
future legislation.44
Although the Burgesses and Governor Dinwiddie concurred 
on the question of the Board's review of colonial laws, 
relations between the two sides quickly deteriorated. Seeking 
to augment his salary as lieutenant governor, Dinwiddie
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decided to require the substantial fee of one pistole to affix 
his seal to a land grant patent. The Council approved of the 
charge, but the Burgesses did not and asked Dinwiddie by what 
authority he demanded the fee. The Burgesses reminded 
Dinwiddie that King William III had disallowed Lord Howard of 
Effingham's attempt to charge a fee for the use of a seal, and 
they informed him that the fee would "be an Infringement of 
the Rights of the People, a great Discouragement to the 
settling the Frontiers of this Colony, and a Prejudice to his 
Majesty's Revenue of Quitrents." Dinwiddie refused to back 
down, so both sides appealed to the Privy Council.45
The Privy Council ruled that Dinwiddie did have a right
to collect the pistole fee, but it directed the Board to 
prepare a letter forbidding the governor to collect the fee on 
patents of less than one hundred acres or to collect a fee on 
the lands lying west of the Allegheny Mountains, because the 
king wished to promote western settlement.46
The Parson's Cause was the third major issue involving 
Virginia to come before the Board of Trade during the Halifax 
era. In 1748, Virginia's General Assembly passed an act 
guaranteeing the colony's Anglican ministers an annual salary 
of sixteen thousand pounds of tobacco. The King in Council 
confirmed the act in 1751.47
Virginia's tobacco crop in 1755 was small, which meant
that the planters had little tobacco with which to pay their
debts, but that what they could sell brought a high price. 
The Burgesses passed, and Governor Dinwiddie approved, a bill
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to relieve Virginia’s planters by allowing them to discharge 
their tobacco debts in money for that year at the rate of 
16s., 8d. per hundredweight, a price below the market price. 
Three years later, another poor tobacco crop again prompted 
the Burgesses to pass a law permitting the discharge of 
tobacco debts in money in 1758. Governor Francis Fauquier, 
newly arrived in Virginia, assented to the law on the basis of 
precedent.48
Virginia's clergy protested the two laws because they 
believed that the rate of exchange was too low, depriving them 
of their rightful salaries. The Rev. John Camm, a professor 
at William and Mary and rector of Yorkhampton Parish, 
presented a memorial to the Privy Council requesting that the 
Council declare the two acts null and void from the time of 
passage, thereby permitting recovery of the clergy's salary.49
After hearings, the Board of Trade recommended 
disallowance of the two acts (though only from the date of 
disallowance, not from time of passage) as contrary to royal 
instructions; the Board noted that they were of less than two 
years' duration, they set aside previous legislation and they 
lacked suspending clauses. The Board ordered Governor 
Fauquier not to assent in the future to any law which repealed 
an allowed law but lacked a suspending clause. The Board of 
Trade had demonstrated again the power inherent in its right 
to review legislation.50
During the Seven Years' War, the House of Burgesses
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reasserted its authority. Although the British government 
sent money and men to North America to fight its French and 
Indian enemies, it also depended on receiving contributions 
from its North American colonies. The Burgesses appropriated 
some money to provision and pay the salaries of Virginia 
regiments, but it required the appointment of a legislative 
committee to direct expenditures and military operations; to 
secure the funds, Governor Dinwiddie had to agree. The 
committee was in place from 1754 through 1757; in 1758 the 
Burgesses concluded that the committee was too expensive to 
operate and issued a detailed appropriation bill instead.51
In October 1748, the General Assembly passed an act 
permitting the governor, in case of invasion, "to levy, raise, 
arm, and muster, such a number of forces, out of the militia 
of this colony, as shall be thought needfull for repelling the 
invasion."52 When the French began to move into the Ohio 
Valley region in 1754, Governor Dinwiddie sent out a small 
expedition under George Washington to warn the French to leave 
and to construct a small fort. The French, however, drove the 
Virginians out and captured the fort. Virginia now had to 
finance a war effort, which the Burgesses were reluctant to 
do.53 Governor Dinwiddie reported to the Board of Trade that 
only "With Persuasions, many Arguments and much Trouble" did 
he secure a bill providing one thousand pounds sterling for 
the colony’s defense, and that bill "was so clogged with 
unreasonable Regulations and Incroachments on the Prerogative" 
that he agreed to it only because military needs required
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it.54
When the Burgesses reconvened in the fall, they voted 
twenty thousand pounds sterling for the colony's defense 
although attaching to it a clause ordering the Treasurer to 
pay twenty-five hundred pounds sterling to an agent to be 
appointed by the Burgesses. The Council refused to assent to 
the bill if the clause was included; the Burgesses charged 
that the Council's vetoing of the bill "at this time of great 
and imminent Danger . . .  is highly injurious to his Majesty's. 
Interest and the Safety of this Colony." Dinwiddie chastised 
both houses for withholding their aid when they knew the 
colony was in danger and in September he prorogued the 
Assembly for a month and a half.55 Dinwiddie complained to 
the Board that it was "impossible to conduct any Expedition in 
these Parts with the Dependence of a Supply from the 
Assemblies without a British Act of Parliament to lay a Poll- 
Tax on the whole Subjects in these Provinces, to bring them to 
a Sense of their Duty to the King."56
When the Burgesses returned in October they voted to 
raise twenty thousand pounds sterling for the militia. But 
the Assembly required the governor to request an additional 
appropriation of money and men in every successive year. The 
Burgesses were unwilling to furnish anything above what they 
considered absolutely necessary to defend the colony of 
Virginia. In 1755 General Braddock, the commander of the 
British and colonial forces in North America, requested 
Virginia to send militiamen to garrison Fort Cumberland,
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thereby freeing the fort's soldiers to fight the French, The 
Burgesses refused because the fort was in Maryland, and 
because they believed the sums already granted for the militia 
"for the Defense of our Frontiers is as much as the People of 
this Colony, in their present unhappy Circumstances are able 
to pay.”57
The Burgesses1 complaint of poverty of both money and men 
was perennial. When Massachusetts' Governor William Shirley 
proposed that the colonies act in concert to fight the French, 
the Burgesses noted that "from the small Number of white 
Inhabitants in this Colony, and the extensive Frontiers we 
have to protect" it would be "very imprudent, to send so great 
a Proportion of them as is demanded of us to so great a 
Distance.” The Burgesses had earlier refused to send Governor 
Dinwiddie to the New York conference "as we have already 
raised as many Men as this Country is able to support."58
Virginia did, however, continue to appropriate money and 
men to protect the colony's frontiers. They defrayed the 
costs of the militia by levying taxes on all tithable persons, 
on land, slaves, and tobacco. But still they claimed poverty, 
noting that without the king's "further Assistance we must 
inevitably sink under our present Load of Debts, and become a 
Prey to our Enemies. "59
In January 1757, Virginia's agent James Abercrombie 
presented a memorial to the king requesting that he grant 
money to Virginia and the other southern colonies "in 
consideration of their great Expenses, and to encourage and
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enable them the better to defend His Majesty's just Rights and 
Possessions.1,60 In the fall of 1760, the General Assembly
received word that Parliament had granted their petition and 
deposited money with Abercrombie. Virginia was thereafter 
able to finance the war effort by bills of exchange drawn on 
Abercrombie or on the Burgesses* agent, Edward Montagu.61
When the money granted by Parliament ran out, the 
Virginia Burgesses decided to end the war-time funding of the 
militia. Noting in November 1762 that "we have no other Means 
of defraying the Expense of the Regiments than by a new 
Emission of Treasury Notes," the Burgesses resolved not to 
continue "the Regiment for a longer Time than it now stands 
provided for." The governor agreed to transmit the reasons 
for discontinuance to the Board, although he lamented that 
"[i]t would have given me the greatest Pleasure if the 
Situation of the Affairs of this Colony would have encouraged 
you to have Kept the Regiment on Foot until we had a Certainty 
of a firm Peace being concluded."62
The Burgesses, because they had the power to levy taxes 
and appropriate money, managed to a considerable extent to 
regulate the degree of Virginia's involvement in the Seven 
Years' War. Although the Board of Trade and the governors 
attempted to persuade them to levy additional money and men, 
the Burgesses maintained their independence.
But the colony greatly increased the amount of its debt 
during the period through its emission of paper money to 
finance the war. Virginia's refusal to promptly retire its
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paper money led directly to the Currency Act of 1764, which 
required that all circulating paper money be retired 
punctually. It was an early and important restrictive measure 
passed by Parliament and it provoked strong protest.63
The Burgesses first turned to the emission of paper money 
in 1755, when they found that the extraordinary taxes they had 
enacted to finance the war had caused a shortage of specie. 
The paper money brought protests to the Board of Trade from 
British merchants, however, because the merchants feared that 
debts contracted with them in sterling would be "discharged in 
Paper Notes of a local, uncertain, and fluctuating Value, 
without any Provision for making Payments in such Paper Notes 
ad valorem of Sterling according to the Difference of Exchange 
at the time of making such payment."64 The Board recommended 
that, since the bills were already in circulation and thus 
repeal would be inconvenient, Virginia should amend the act to 
make debts contracted in sterling before passage of the act 
payable in sterling only. The General Assembly complied.65
In 1762 the British merchants complained to the Board 
again; they said that Virginia's currency act, by allowing the 
colony's judges to set the sterling exchange at a rate they 
felt just, was often prejudicial to their interests.66 The 
Board of Trade, reviewing Virginia's laws, ruled that the 
funds the colony had established to redeem its paper money 
were inadequate. The Burgesses promised to make up any 
shortfall in the fund "by a new and adequate tax." The 
governor passed on the Burgesses' resolutions to the Board,
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although he asked "What Objection could there have been to 
your having bound yourselves, by a firm Resolve of the whole 
Legislature, to have provided for a full Payment of all the 
Notes outstanding . . . ?"67
In December 1762, the Board of Trade warned the colonial 
agents that if the colonies continued to use bills of credit 
as legal tender the Board would refer the matter to 
Parliament. In the spring of 1764 the Board submitted a 
report to the Privy Council in which it said that the practice 
of using paper money destroyed public credit, ruined the 
colonies, and injured commerce; it recommended Parliamentary 
action and enclosed the outlines of a bill. Parliament 
followed the Board's suggestion and passed the Currency Act, 
forbidding the colonists to issue any paper currency after 
September 1, 17 64 and ordering the prompt retirement of all 
currency then circulating.68
Despite Parliament's legislation, the Burgesses
petitioned the Board of Trade in 1768 to allow them to print
*
paper money sufficient to cover the colony's shortage of hard 
currency. The Board recommended disallowance of the request 
because the Council had formally expressed their dissent to 
the plan. Virginia did not petition to emit paper money 
again.69
The question of westward expansion also troubled 
Virginia's colonists in the 1750s and 1760s. In 1753 the 
Burgesses resolved to petition the king to grant the lands 
lying west of the Allegheny Mountains to Protestants willing
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to settle them. The Board of Trade, believing that settlement 
would halt French encroachment, recommended that the King-in- 
Council grant the Burgesses' request.70
Instead, at the conclusion of the Seven Years' War the 
British government issued the Proclamation of 1763, forbidding 
the colonists to settle on newly-declared Indian lands west of 
the Appalachian Mountains. Two years later the Board of Trade 
issued additional instructions to the governors of 
Pennsylvania and Virginia "enjoining them to cause immediate 
Evacuation of such Settlements upon the Indian Territory 
contiguous to the River Ohio."71 The Board reiterated its 
opposition to westward colonial expansion in 1768. In the 
following year the Board reconsidered the boundary line 
between Virginia and the Cherokee Nation and extended the 
colonists' land claim, although in 1770 Secretary of State 
Hillsborough forbade Virginia to make any further grants of 
land beyond the limits of the Proclamation of 1763.72
To raise money for military expenses during the era of 
the Seven Years' War, the General Assembly passed several acts 
taxing slaves imported into Virginia from Africa and from 
other British colonies; the Board permitted them to stand.73 
The Board, however, recommended disallowance of the 10 percent 
duty on slaves passed in 17 66 because the bill's preamble 
declared "that no other duty can be laid upon our import or 
export without oppressing your subjects." The Board noted 
that the declaration seemed "highly unnecessary and improper 
in this place" and could "only operate to restrain and deter
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the legislature of Virginia from making further Provisions if 
such shall be required of them in future Cases of 
Emergency. "74
In 1769 and 1772 the Burgesses passed additional acts 
placing duties on slaves imported into Virginia. The 
Burgesses tried to deter the slave trade via the act of 1772 
because they considered the trade one "of great Inhumanity" 
which endangered the existence of the American colonies by 
retarding white settlement. The Board recommended
disallowance of both laws because they prejudiced the commerce 
and manufacture of Britain as well as the culture of tobacco 
in Virginia.75
After 1765, the most important restrictions on colonial 
self-government came from Parliament, not from the Board of 
Trade. At the end of the Seven Years* War, Britain's national 
debt stood at over 122 million pounds sterling. Remembering 
that the colonies had been reluctant to fund their share of 
the wartime expenses, Chancellor of the Exchequer George 
Grenville decided to fund a larger share of the administrative 
costs of the colonies through duties. Virginia accepted the 
Sugar Act of 1764, which tightened trade regulations, but 
opposed the Stamp Act, which was solely a revenue-producing 
bill.76
In 1764 the Assembly and Council sent memorials opposing 
the proposed Stamp Act to the king and to the houses of 
Parliament. The memorial noted that Virginians "have been
73
invested with the Right of taxing their own People from the 
first Establishment of a regular Government in the Colony”; 
from that ”they must conclude they cannot now be deprived of 
a Right they have so long enjoyed, and which they have never 
forfeited.”77 The Burgesses' agent, Edward Montagu, found an 
opposition member willing to introduce Virginia's memorial, 
but Commons refused to accept any petitions from America 
before passing the Stamp Act in 1765.
Patrick Henry with several other legislators drafted a 
set of resolutions opposing the Stamp Act, which the Burgesses 
passed on May 30, 1765. The resolves declared that Virginians 
"have without Interruption enjoyed the inestimable Right of 
being governed by such Laws, respecting their internal Polity 
and Taxation, as are derived from their own Consent, with the 
Approbation of their Sovereign, or his Substitute.” After 
learning of the resolves Governor Fauquier dissolved the 
Assembly.78
The Board of Trade warned the king that the resolutions, 
"as they contain an absolute Disavowal of the Right of the 
Parliament of Great Britain to impose Taxes upon her Colonies 
and a daring attack upon the Constitution of this Country, 
appear to us to require an immediate and Serious Attention."79 
The response which came from Parliament in the spring of 1766 
was in the form of a repeal of the Stamp Act. The Board, 
however, still desired to uphold the royal prerogative to 
impose such a tax. In its 1768 instructions to Governor 
Botetourt, the Board asked him to remind the Assembly of the
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king's "firm resolution to support and preserve entire our 
ancient, just, and constitutional right to enact laws, by and 
with the advice and consent of our parliament, to bind all and 
every part of our empire in all cases whatsoever."80
A new crisis had erupted by the time Botetourt arrived in 
Virginia. In 1767 Parliament had passed the Townshend Acts, 
a revenue-producing measure taxing tea, glass, paint, and 
paper imported into the colonies. In April 1768 the Burgesses 
passed memorials addressed to the king and the houses of Lords 
and of Commons reiterating the Virginia colonists' "antient 
and inestimable right of being Governed by such Laws only, 
respecting their internal Polity and Taxation as are desired 
from their own Consent with the approbation of their 
Sovereign."81 When Botetourt arrived in Virginia in October 
1768 he decided against delivering the speech the Board of 
Trade had prepared for him, but he did dissolve the 
legislature for calling into question Parliament's authority 
to tax the colonies.82
When the new legislature met in May 1769, the Burgesses 
adopted another set of resolves declaring "that the sole Right 
of imposing Taxes on the Inhabitants of this his Majesty's 
Colony and Dominion of Virginia, is now, and ever hath been, 
legally and constitutionally vested in the House of 
Burgesses."83 Botetourt dissolved the assembly again on May 
17, 1769. The Burgesses, however, simply moved down the
street to Williamsburg's Raleigh Tavern where they adopted the 
Virginia Association, an agreement to refrain from the
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consumption of taxed goods until Parliament repealed the 
Townshend duties.84
In 1770, Parliament repealed the taxes, except for the 
tax on tea, but in June 1770 the Burgesses and merchants of 
Virginia again entered into an association providing for the 
nonimportation of enumerated goods. The agreement cited their 
"great and just apprehensions of the fatal consequence 
certainly to follow from the arbitrary imposition of taxes on 
the people of America, for the purpose of raising a revenue 
from them, without the consent of their representatives.1,85 
The Burgesses, in a petition to the king, warned that a 
"partial Suspension of Duties . . . cannot, Great Sir, remove 
the . . . well grounded Fears and Apprehensions of your
Majesty's loyal Subjects," particularly when the tea tax was 
retained "for the avow'd Purpose of establishing a Precedent 
against us.”86
In March 1773, the Burgesses resolved to appoint a 
committee of correspondence to confer with the other North 
American colonies following rumors of "proceedings tending to 
deprive them of their ancient, legal and constitutional 
Rights." In a letter to the king, the Board of Trade noted 
that "we think that the inviting the other Colonies to a 
communication and correspondence upon such matters . . .  is a 
measure of a most dangerous tendency and Effect," and 
recommended that the king take such actions as the king and 
Privy Council shall feel necessary.87
The passage of the Tea Act in 1773 again roused colonial
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opposition to Parliamentary taxation. In Boston, colonists 
dumped the tea into the harbor, prompting Parliament to pass 
the Boston Port Act closing Boston harbor to commerce from 
June 1, 1774, forward. In response to the Port Act, Virginia 
Burgesses Thomas Jefferson, Richard Henry Lee, Francis 
Lightfoot Lee, and Patrick Henry planned a resolution making 
June 1 a day of fasting and prayer in Virginia. Robert Carter 
Nicholas introduced the resolution on May 24 and the House 
passed it unanimously. Two days later, Governor John Murray, 
the Earl of Dunmore, dissolved the Assembly. Meeting 
unofficially the next day, the Burgesses called for a general 
meeting of all the colonies and for a Virginia-wide meeting to 
address the question of non-importation. Virginia's period of 
colonial government had effectively ended. The colony's 
representatives now conducted their most important business at 
extra-legal conventions outside the control of the British 
governor.88
When the colony's representatives met in an extra-legal 
convention in August 1774 they selected delegates to the First 
Continental Congress. Meeting periodically in the following 
months, Virginia's representatives considered the actions 
taken by the Continental Congress and prepared for the 
colony's defense.89
All pretense of direct British rule ended in June 1775 
when Governor Dunmore was, as he told the Assembly, "fully 
persuaded that my Person, and those of my Family likewise, are 
in constant danger of falling sacrifices to the blind and
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unmeasurable fury which has so unaccountably seised upon the 
minds and understanding of great numbers of People.” He 
removed himself to his Majesty’s ship, Fowey. anchored off 
York. Control of Virginia’s government now lay entirely in 
the hands of the colonists.
In 1748, the British government had tried to restrain its 
increasingly independent American colonies by reasserting 
Whitehall’s authority after a period of salutary neglect. But 
neither the Board of Trade nor Parliament managed to strike a 
balance which permitted a degree of colonial self-government 
within a framework of imperial control. Attempting to 
regulate the colonies completely, Britain gave them an 
incentive to break away.
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CHAPTER III
CONCLUSION
By 1748, when the Board of Trade asserted its power over 
the colonies, Virginia was well on its way to becoming a 
politically self-sufficient colony. All the branches of 
government from magistrates to councillors, with the sole 
exception of the governorship, were in the hands of native- 
born Virginians. The House of Burgesses, because it approved 
new taxes and controlled the colony's treasurer, had become a 
strong rival to the governor.1
Unlike the governors, who were frequently reminded by the 
Board of Trade to take an empire-wide view when making policy, 
the House of Burgesses concerned itself primarily with local 
affairs. During the 1740s, 1750s, and 1760s, Britain was
almost constantly involved in North American warfare and 
expected the colonies to contribute men and money for defense. 
Although Governor Spotswood led Virginia troops into North 
Carolina in 1713, and in 1740 the Assembly sent a regiment of 
Viriginians to fight in Cartagena, the Burgesses thereafter 
agreed only to send men to protect Virginia's borders and 
allocated funds only as long as encroaching foes threatened 
Virginia's safety. The Burgesses' provinciality was one 
factor prompting Britain to strengthen central control.2
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Other, equally compelling, interests also existed. The 
wishes of the Virginia legislators— to emit paper money, to 
settle lands beyond the Proclamation Line of 1763, to pass 
locally needed laws without interference from the central 
government— were diverging increasingly from the policies 
preferred by the Board of Trade. Stricter directives, the 
Board hoped, would curb this provincial independence.3 The 
Board also needed to support the men whom it appointed to 
govern the colonies. Aside from Governor Robert Dinwiddie, 
the Virginia governors in this period were not particularly 
forceful men, and the terms they served were generally short. 
Four times between 1749 and 1771 the Council president served 
as acting governor due to the death of resignation of the 
governor. These men, more than regular governors, showed 
reluctance to side with the Board against the wishes of the 
House of Burgesses, and were more willing to explain the 
Burgesses' actions to a disapproving Board of Trade.4
The colonists did, however, continue to acknowledge the 
Board's power. Several times in the years following 1748, 
members of Virginia's provincial government requested the 
Board to act as mediator between the governor and the House of 
Burgesses.5 In accepting the right of the Board to act as 
arbiter, the colonial governments strengthened the Board's 
right to rule the colonies. The Board's authority to hold 
such inquiries had been present since the earliest days of the 
Board's existence, when Councillor John Blair had petitioned 
the Board to remove Governor Edmund Andros. After the
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expiration of Governor Alexander Spotswood's term, however, 
the frequency of the Burgesses' appeals to the Board to limit 
the governor's power declined until Governor Dinwiddie took 
office.
The Board was most effective in the role of mediator and 
advisor. As it had been crafted, the Board lacked authority 
to rule the colonies directly. Instead, officials in the 
colonies, subject to the approval of the king, passed the laws 
that guided the day-to-day life of the provinces, while the 
king and Parliament laid out the guidelines that shaped 
colonial policy. The Board was a clearinghouse, interpreting 
Parliamentary law and passing it along to the colonies while 
also receiving proposed statutes from the provinces, examining 
them, and recommending that the king accept or disallow them. 
Consequently, the Board was most effective when it had strong 
members, as it did in its earliest years, or a , strong 
president, as it did when the Earl of Halifax presided.
Halifax secured extensive executive powers and regained 
a monopoly on correspondence with the colonies; he also 
controlled patronage networks that gave him influence in 
Parliament. His successor, Lord Sandys, however, agreed to a 
diminished role for the Board; the body's power to control 
correspondence and patronage, regained under Halifax, were 
stripped away by William Pitt in 1761. As a result, authority 
to govern the colonies shifted to Parliament and to the 
Secretary of State for the Southern Department.6 Since the 
most important colonial issues in the 1760s and 1770s
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concerned Britain*s attempts to extract revenues from the 
colonies and to wage war against them— policies whose nature 
demanded that Parliament legislate for the unwilling colonies- 
-the Board of Trade ceased to be a vital force determining 
policy for the thirteen colonies.
For over fifty years, however, the Board of Trade had 
allowed the colonial governments of the thirteen colonies to 
develop a measure of self-rule, confining the Board's role to 
arbitrating disputes. The members of Virginia's House of 
Burgesses had begun to consider their branch as a miniature 
House of Commons, exercising the same powers as Parliament. 
For this reason, when the British Parliament began to pass 
more stringent rules regulating the colonies in the 1760s and 
177 0s, the Virginians appealed to the king to act as arbiter 
in these disputes. Unlike the members of the Board of Trade, 
the king seemed to ignore their requests— he preferred to 
allow Parliament to continue its policies. Finding that they 
could receive no relief via ordinary channels, provincial 
leaders in Virginia joined with those of the twelve other 
colonies to seek relief via the extraordinary avenues of the 
Continental Congpress and the American Revolution.
88
NOTES FOR CHAPTER III
1. Percy Scott Flippin, The Roval Government in Virginia. 
1624—1775 (New York, 1919), 169, 209-213; Jack P. Greene, The 
Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of Assembly in the Southern 
Roval Colonies, 1689-1776 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1963), 80-81,
101-104, 245-248; H. R. Mcllwaine, ed. , Journals of the House 
of Burgesses. 8 vols. (Richmond, Va., 1915-1919), 1695/96-
1700/02: 71; Leonard Woods Labaree, ed. , Roval Instructions to 
British Colonial Governors. 1670-1776. 2 vols. (New York,
1935), I, 203-204.
2. John Pendleton Kennedy, ed., The Journals of the House of 
Burgesses of Virginia. 1761-1765 (Richmond, Va., ), 115.
3. The 1752 disallowance of 10 Virginia laws offers one 
example. The House of Burgesses and the Council believed that 
the Board did not sufficiently understand the colony's need 
for the disallowed laws. The Board, however, saw its review 
as providing an opportunity to limit the colonies' discretion; 
henceforth, the use of suspending clauses for colonial laws 
was enforced. H. R. Mcllwaine, ed., Legislative Journals of 
the Council of Virginia. 3 vols. (Richmond, Va., 1918-1919), 
II, 1082-1087; C.O. 5/1366, 479-504, S.R. 845; Warren M. 
Billings et. al. . Colonial Virginia: A History (White Plains, 
N.Y., 1986), 254-255.
4. See, for example, Acting Governor William Nelson's 
contention to the Board that its remoteness from Virginia led 
it to censure the colony's acts, "however unexceptionable [the 
Burgesses'] conduct may be." Nelson letter to Secretary of 
State, Mar. 27, 177i, in John C. Van Horne, ed., The
Correspondence of William Nelson as Acting Governor of 
Virginia. 1770-1771 (Charlottesville, Va.), 132.
5. See the Burgesses' appeals to the Board to settle the 
Pistole Fee Controversy. Mcllwaine, ed., Burgesses Journals. 
1752/55-1756/58: 143; Billings et al. , Colonial Virginia. 256- 
257.
6. James A. Henretta, Salutary Neglect: Colonial 
Administration Under the Duke of Newcastle (Princeton, N.J., 
1972), 308-309; Arthur Herbert Bayse, The Lords Commissioners 
of Trade and Plantations. Commonly Known as the Board of 
Trade. 1748-1782 (New Haven, Conn., 1925), 105-109.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources:
Boehm, Ralph, ed. Records of the British Colonial Office. 
Class 5, Part: 2: The Board of Trade. 1660-1782. Reels 
1-5.
Brock, R. A. , ed. Official Letters of Alexander Spotswood. 
Lieutenant Governor of the Colony of Virginia. 1710-1722. 
Collections of the Virginia Historical Society. 2 vols. 
Richmond, Va.: Virginia Historical Society, 1882-1885.
Browning, Andrew, ed. English Historical Documents. 1660- 
1714. David C. Douglas, general ed. vol. 8. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1953.
Davies, K. G., ed. Documents of the American Revolution. 
1770-1783 (Colonial Office Series^. 21 vols. Shannon:
Irish University Press, 1972-1981.
Earlv American Imprints. 1639-1800. Worcester, Mass.: 
American Antiquarian Society, 1956.
Hening, William Waller, ed. The Statutes at Large: Being a
Collection of all the Laws of Virginia from the First 
Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619. vols. 1-9. 
Richmond: 1809-1821.
Labaree, Leonard Woods, ed. Roval Instructions to British 
Colonial Governors. 1670-1776. 2 vols. New York,1
D. Appleton-Century Co., 1935.
Kennedy, John Pendleton, and H. R. Mcllwaine, eds. Journals 
of the House of Burgesses of Virginia. 13 vols. 
Richmond, Va.: Virginia State Library, 1905-1919.
Mcllwaine, H. R., ed. Legislative Journals of the Council of 
Virginia. 3 vols. Richmond, Va. : Virginia State
Library, 1918-1919.
Palmer, Wm. P. , ed. Calendar of Virginia State Papers and 
Other Manuscripts. 1652-1781. vol. 1. Richmond: 
Virginia State Library, 1875.
Public Records Office, London, Colonial Office, Class 5 Survey
89
90
Reports (Virginia Colonial Records Project).
Van Horne, John C ., ed. The Correspondence of William Nelson 
as Acting Governor of Virginia, 1770-1771. 
Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia,
1975.
_____ . "The Correspondence of James Blair As Acting Governor
of Virginia, 1740-1741.” The Virginia Magazine of 
History and Biography. LXXXIV (1976), 19-48.
Secondary Sources:
Bayse, Arthur Herbert. The Lords Commissioners of Trade and 
Plantations. Commonly Known as the Board of Trade. 1748- 
1782. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1925.
Bieber, Ralph Paul. The Lords of Trade and Plantations. 1675- 
1696. Allentown, Pa.: H. R. Haas and Co., 1919.
Billings, Warren M. , et. al. Colonial Virginia: A History. 
White Plains, N.Y.: KTO Press, 1986.
Clark, Dora Mae. The Rise of the British Treasury: Colonial 
Administration in the Eighteenth Century. New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1960.
Dickerson, Oliver Morton. American Colonial Government. 1696- 
1765. Cleveland, Ohio: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1912.
Flippin, Percy Scott. The Roval Government in Virginia. 1624- 
1775. New York: Columbia University Press, 1919.
Greene, Jack P. The Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of 
Assembly in the Southern Roval Colonies. 1689-177 6. 
Chapel Hill, N.C.: Institute of Early American History
and Culture, 1963.
Griffith, Lucille. The Virginia House of Burgesses. 1750- 
1774. Northport, Ala.: University of Alabama Press,
1963.
Hallam, Henry. The Constitutional History of England. 3 
vols. Paris: Fain and Thunot, 1841.
Henretta, James A. Salutary Neglect: Colonial Administration 
Under the Duke of Newcastle. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1972.
Kammen, Michael G. A Rope of Sand: The Colonial Agents.
British Politics, and the American Revolution. (Ithaca, 
N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968)*
91
Kukla, Jon. Speakers and Clerks of the Virginia House of 
Burgesses. 1643-1776. (Richmond, Va.: Virginia State
Library, 1981).
Morgan, Gwenda. "'The Privilege of Making Laws'; The Board 
of Trade, the Virginia Assembly and Legislative Review, 
1748-54," Journal of American Studies. X (1976), 1-15.
Quitt, Martin H. Virginia House of Burgesses. 1660-1760: 
The Social. Educational, and Economic Bases of Political 
Power. Outstanding Studies in Earlv American History. 
John Murrin, ed. New York: Garland Publishing Co.,
1989.
Russell, Elmer Beecher. The Review of American Colonial
Legislation bv the King in Council. Studies in History.. 
Economics and Public Law. New York: Octagon Books, 1976
(orig. pub. 1915).
Smith, Joseph Henry. Appeals to the P r i w  Council from the 
Plantations. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950.
Steele, I. K. "The Board of Trade, the Quakers, and 
Resumption of Colonial Charters, 1699-1702," William 
and Marv Quarterly. 3d Ser., XXIII (1966), 596-619.
_____ .Politics of Colonial Policy; The Board of Trade in
Colonial Administration. 1696-1720. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1968.
_____ . The English Atlantic. 1675-1740: An Exploration of
Communication and Community. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986.
VITA
Marv Carroll Johansen 
Born in New York, New York, May 5, 1966. Graduated from 
Our Lady of Victory Academy, Dobbs Ferry, New York, May 1984, 
A.B. cum laude, Georgetown University, 1988. M. A. candidate, 
College of William and Mary, 1990-1992. The course 
requirements for this degree have been completed.
In May 1991, the author was admitted to the doctoral 
program in history at the College of William and Mary.
92
